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EDITOR’S NOTE
The ‘Policy Debate’ section of International Development Policy offers a platform where academics, 
policy makers and reflective practitioners engage in critical dialogue on specific development 
challenges. The initial lead paper is not peer-reviewed. Instead, it is followed by reactions and 
critical comments from different stakeholders. 
The lead paper below, written in December 2012 by Werner Thut (swiss agency for Development 
and cooperation), is followed by reactions and analysis from alexandra Gillies (revenue Watch 
Institute, new York), humberto campodonico (universidad nacional Mayor de san Marcos, lima) 
and stéphane Graber (Geneva Trading & shipping association). readers who are intetested are 
invited to contribute to this policy debate on our blog < http://devpol.hypotheses.org/19 >.
initial contribution by werner thut, senior Policy Advisor eU development Affairs at the 
department of Foreign Affairs (FdFA), swiss Agency for development and cooperation (sdc, 
Analysis & Policy division < http://www.sdc.admin.ch >). this contribution reflects the 
personal views of the author, and does not necessarily represent the official position of the sdc.
commodities and switzerland:  
development Policy challenges and Policy options
Paper’s Abstract
Switzerland is one of the world’s largest commodity trading hub. The author, senior policy adviser at 
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), reviews experiences and policy options 
related to commodity trading from a development policy perspective. While this sector has become 
of strategic importance to Switzerland’s economy, it also entails a number of risks. On the other hand, 
Swiss development cooperation efforts focus on several resource-rich countries, whose mineral and 
agricultural commodities are traded via Switzerland. How can Switzerland assist these countries to 
reap the benefits of their natural resource wealth? This paper looks at development policy aspects 
of commodity trading in relation to Swiss foreign and domestic policy. It examines ongoing policy 
debates in Switzerland and discusses development policy options.
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1. Introduction
the topic of commodities – understood as the result of both mining and 
agricultural activities – is a particularly diverse one, and includes the closely-
related and globally-intertwined sub-processes of resource extraction, trade 
and usage. At each stage of the value chain and beyond, the issue presents 
development policy challenges. in resource-rich developing countries, there 
are implications for social, environmental and legal-institutional, as well 
as export revenue, tax and distributional, policies. in the resource-hungry 
countries of the organisation for economic cooperation and development 
(oecd) and in emerging economies, commodities issues include questions 
relating to the size of their ecological footprints and to the security of supply. 
similarly, another hotly debated aspect is the role of corporations, and their 
share of revenues, in this industry.
this document focuses on concerns, experiences and possible courses 
of action relating to commodities that are particularly relevant for swiss 
international development cooperation. on the one hand, these courses of 
action arise from the mandate, potential and experience of swiss international 
development cooperation. the swiss Agency for development and coopera-
tion (sdc) and the economic development division of the state secretariat 
for economic Affairs (seco) are active in many countries rich in mining 
resources, such as Afghanistan, bolivia, chad, colombia, ghana, Mongolia, 
niger, Peru, south Africa and the great lakes region of Africa. in many of 
swiss development cooperation’s priority countries, mining and agricultural 
production are incorporated in value chains that are traded via switzerland. 
As a result, the question arises as to how switzerland can assist these countries 
to fully reap the benefits of their natural resource wealth.
on the other hand, with respect to policy coherence for development, this 
overview also considers the role played by commodity trading companies that 
are based in switzerland and thus subject to swiss law. switzerland weighs 
heavily in the commodity trading industry, with swiss-based companies or 
resident subsidiaries accounting for an estimated 15-25 per cent of global 
trade in (mining and agricultural) commodities. Furthermore, switzerland 
is one of the world’s most successful centres of financial and other services, 
providing the commodity trading industry with vital financial and legal ser-
vices, logistics, insurance, etc.1 Ultimately, the swiss regulatory framework, 
with its structure of corporate and tax legislation, constitutes the overall 
environment that determines the scope for business operations. it is there-
fore no coincidence that switzerland itself has become part of the current 
discussions at the international level regarding the more problematic aspects 
of resource extraction and commodity trading. A principal line of inquiry 
in these discussions focuses on the scale and nature of illicit financial flows 
(iFFs). From this perspective, questions arise as to the coherence for develop-
1 The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) estimates the amount of capital held in Swiss banks at over USD 2 trillion, or 27 
per cent of all offshore wealth, quoted in an article published in The Economist on February 11, 2012; ‘Don’t ask, won’t 
tell - Amid a global squeeze on tax evasion, Switzerland is the prime target’: http://www.economist.com/node/21547229 
(accessed on April 22, 2013). Offshore wealth is defined by BCG as ‘assets booked in a country where the investor has no 
legal residence or tax domicile’. For more details see BCG Report (Becerra et al., 2001).
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ment of some components of swiss policies, including those relating to trade 
and international taxation.
BOX 1: Switzerland’s Commodity Trading Industry in International Media
The announced merger, expected to be completed in 2013, of the commodities trading firm Glencore, 
situated in baar, switzerland, with the mining operator Xstrata, located in neighbouring zug, will result 
in the largest merger ever witnessed in the commodities sector. In one stroke, the new company will 
become, in terms of annual revenue, both the second largest commodities trader and the fourth largest 
mining operator in the world.2 analysts estimate that the combined turnover of all businesses within the 
new company will amount to usD 210 billion. after Glencore’s initial public offer in May 2011, this merger 
plan further propelled the swiss-based commodity trading industry into the international spotlight, and 
not only for global investors, as the development and political dimensions of this industry became the 
focal point of international discussions and analyses.
how do development policy aspects of the commodities trade relate to swiss 
foreign and domestic policy more generally? As the swiss Federal council has 
prominently stated, the commodities trade is not only a sector of strategic eco-
nomic importance to switzerland, but is accompanied by a number of related 
risks (Federal department of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Moreover, there are major 
challenges from the perspective of policy coherence for development, a priority 
of the swiss, as well as the international, development debate. in this context, 
swiss international development cooperation actively engages in inter-minis-
terial and domestic debates to argue in favour of a swiss foreign and domestic 
policy that actively takes the interests of poor, resource-exporting developing 
countries into consideration. with this strategic approach, swiss develop-
ment policy ultimately contributes to the strengthening of switzerland as an 
internationally respected and competitive economic centre, thus promoting 
sustainable growth over the long term.
this paper3 addresses commodity production and trade from a develop-
ment policy standpoint. it reviews current debates and emerging policies in 
selected countries as well as major international initiatives. ongoing debates 
in switzerland and development policy options for switzerland are then be 
examined.
in conclusion, the paper advocates for a balanced approach, wherein swiss 
development and foreign economic policies help ensure that (a) foreign invest-
ments respect internationally-agreed standards, (b) resource-rich developing 
countries retain a fair share of profits generated from this trade, and (c) the 
2 There are different ways of measuring the size of a company. According to an Al Jazeera article, Glencore is ‘the 
world’s biggest listed trader of commodities by capitalization’ (‘Glencore: Taking over the world?’ http://www.aljazeera.
com/programmes/countingthecost/2011/05/20115299504775782.html; accessed on April 22, 2013). Similarly, Foreign 
Policy magazine, in a May/June 2012 article, depicts Glencore as the ‘world’s biggest commodities brokerage firm with a 
financial valuation higher than Boeing or Ford Motors’, Silverstein, K. (2012) ‘A Giant Among Giants’, http://www.foreign-
policy.com/articles/2012/04/23/a_giant_among_giants?page=0,5 (accessed on April 22, 2013).
3 The topic of commodities touches upon many other areas of government policy, and most large Western nations have 
developed fully-fledged resource strategies. Such strategies deal with a large number of issues, including the availability 
of, and access to, important strategic energy resources and environmental issues. This paper, however, will not seek to 
address these concerns.
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populations of these countries actually benefit from said profits, as they are 
to be invested in economic and social development, with the ultimate goal 
of eliminating poverty.
2. Commodities Production and Trade from a Development Policy 
Standpoint
this paper divides the term commodity into the most common three cate-
gories: fossil fuels, ores and metals (minerals), and agricultural commodities 
(soft commodities). Fossil fuels include oil, gas, and coal. Minerals refer to 
metals such as iron, non-iron metals and precious metals. Agricultural com-
modities, in turn, refer to grains, luxury foodstuffs (such as coffee or tobacco), 
sugar, plant/vegetable oils and fibres for textile production.
in the swiss context, the commodity trade itself is a central feature of 
any discussion related to global resource use. we have therefore chosen a 
broad perspective that takes into consideration the entire value-added chain, 
from production, to trade, to consumption. only from such a perspective is it 
possible to analyse the implications of the trade for development policy and 
identify possible courses of action.
Accordingly, we will first examine the importance of the commodity trade 
for resource-exporting developing countries, including associated financial 
flows and the challenges they present. secondly, the paper will consider the 
commodity trading industry in switzerland.
2.1. Commodities Production and Trade –  
Challenges for Exporting Developing Countries
the following figures illustrate the importance of resource extraction and 
trade for developing countries:4 the global trade in commodities, including 
fossil fuels, minerals and agricultural commodities, measured in commercial 
value, amounts to an estimated Usd 3000 billion annually. the fossil fuel 
sector dwarfs all other extractive sectors, accounting for about 65 per cent of 
this overall figure. non-fuel minerals and agricultural commodities account 
for 20 per cent each.5 59 per cent of metals and ores (71 per cent per cent in the 
case of copper), 63 per cent of coal and 64 per cent of oil consumed in the world 
originate in developing countries. 60 per cent (and rising) of global mining 
production comes from politically unstable and extremely unstable countries.
Another dimension of the commodity problematic concerns the trade in 
agricultural, or soft, commodities. their renewable nature makes these com-
modities unique in this analysis. in addition, according to some studies, this 
sector is characterised by the considerable market power of several large, 
vertically-integrated trading firms and, correspondingly, a potentially negative 
impact upon markets. in this context, there is intensive debate as to whether, 
and to what degree, there exists a connection between the speculative busi-
4 For the numbers quoted in this chapter, see Le Billon, P. (2011); Berne Declaration (2011a); Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomy, Family and Youth of the Republic of Austria (2011), pp. 26-27.
5 Estimates of the total value differ greatly. The cited numbers are drawn from the Bern Declaration 2011 (see footnote 
6). According to Le Billon, extractive sectors alone currently generate about USD 3.5 trillion in annual gross revenue, 
corresponding to around 5 per cent of GDP.
 | 157
Policy Debate Commodity Trading
ness practices of certain market actors and the widely fluctuating (though 
generally rising) prices of agricultural commodities experienced over the last 
few decades. while evidence is not conclusive, some analyses have found a 
connection between the business practices of certain private actors in the 
financial markets and a trend towards speculative trades, large-scale land 
grabs and even human rights abuses.6
naturally, the economic and political conditions present in resource-expor-
ting countries vary widely. this is particularly true with regard to tax regimes, 
and therefore to the structure of state revenues, and the nature, breadth, 
and quality of services each state is able to provide. while the contribution 
that resource extraction makes to state revenues in resource-rich developing 
countries can be significant, the contribution from minerals specifically is 
minimal – with the exception of a few countries like botswana (over 40 per 
cent), chile and guinea (between 10 per cent and 20 per cent), this contribu-
tion is regularly less than 10 per cent of the state revenues. tanzania’s mining 
sector, for example, has attracted Usd 2.5 billion in investment over the last 
decade, accounting for 40 per cent of exports but only 3.6 per cent of state 
revenues. some countries, such as ghana and tanzania, have made positive 
strides on this front, as their governments are reviewing old contractual 
arrangements with the mining industry in order to correct this unfavourable 
situation. the opposite, however, is often the case with oil, whose revenues 
generally contribute a substantial amount to national finances. these amounts, 
it should be noted, fluctuate considerably (from between 70-90 per cent in the 
case of the traditional oil-producing countries, to under 10 per cent in the 
case of new producers).
natural resources generally hold significant or even transformative potential 
to spur sustainable economic growth and overcome existing poverty. they 
can support raising public funds, foreign currency reserves and investments, 
generate employment and downstream economic activities, and also improve 
energy security. At the same time, many resource-rich countries do not take full 
advantage of their natural resources. in fact, there is considerable evidence that 
natural resource abundance often coexists with pervasive poverty – a phe-
nomenon widely-known as the ‘resource curse’.7 numerous studies highlight 
the damage caused to human health, the environment and the forces fuelling 
expropriation and conflict, while others (including audits) document prac-
tices of corruption, illegal extraction and tax evasion.8 other studies analyse 
and rate the local initiatives of international actors with regards to corporate 
social responsibility and social investment.9
6 Some papers point to a causal relationship between speculative trades and price increases. See for instance, Baffes, 
J. and T. Haniotis Timmer (2010) and Friends of the Earth (2012). 
7 See for example Collier, P. (2007). For an overview of economic studies, see van der Ploeg, F. (2011).
8 Bern Declaration (2011b); Bergbau-Lizenzvergabe im Kongo (confidential background paper, also quoted in the TV pro-
gramme ECO on SFDRS, 05.03.2012; http://www.sendungen.sf.tv/eco/Sendungen/eco/Archiv/Sendung-vom-05.03.2012 
(accessed on April 22, 2013). For the African context, these realities are well documented in the most recent report of Inter-
national Study Group to Review Africa’s Mining Regimes (2011). For more details, see Chapter 3.1 of that report.
9 For case studies of the specific aspects of these initiatives, see ECDPM, Extractive Industries and Local Development. 
Annotated Bibliography, 2012 (internal document); and World Bank documents in its Extractive Industries for Development Series 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,contentMDK:22278227~menuPK:6456599~pagePK
:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:336930,00.html (accessed on April 24, 2013).
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with regard to the use of natural resources, most resource-exporting countries 
in the developing world face a number of specific challenges, among them: 
•	 signing bad deals: governments often fail to negotiate a fair share of poten-
tial revenues for their respective country due to weak capacities or the 
prevalence of short-sighted interests (including bribery). in these cases, 
companies pay what is owed, but the amount is far less than what the 
country would equitably receive under a fair contract.10
•	 revenues are collected but misallocated: Publicly-owned resources are 
diverted before they are incorporated in budgets of public entities. For 
example, national oil companies can collect revenues and then spend on 
behalf of officials, or invest in businesses controlled by political elites. 
Furthermore, revenues may be transferred to private accounts or spent on 
corrupt contracts.
•	 Underpayment of revenues: due to either tax avoidance or tax evasion, 
countries do not collect the revenues to which they are entitled. Avoidance 
occurs when companies (legally) minimize the tax burden through transfer 
pricing, such that profits are shifted to and reported in the subsidiary with 
lowest tax burden.
consistent with this reality, from a development perspective, both major 
financial flows, including iFFs/flows of capital flight11, and large-scale invest-
ments in agricultural land are significant features of commodity production 
and trade.
while the reliability of specific figures remains quite limited (which corres-
pondingly tempers their analytical value)12, data from an increasing number 
of sources illustrate the magnitude of such financial flows and their influence, 
as well as potential policy responses.
the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) 
estimates that global illicit flows, including all illegal and illicit transfers from 
various sources and sectors in developing countries, amount to approximately 
Usd 850 to 1000 billion per year, far exceeding inflows from official deve-
lopment Assistance (odA), which, in 2011 reached only Usd 133.5 billion), 
and Foreign direct investment (Fdi). 60 per cent of this outflow is the result 
of tax evasion. A commission set up by the norwegian government produced 
similar figures, estimating that in 2006 iFFs amounted to between Usd 640 
10 A few examples are briefly mentioned in this paper. For a detailed description, see the below market price sale of 
assets in the DRC described in the Global Witness report (2012), Secrecy Surronding Glencore’s Business Deals in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo Risks Exposing Shareholders to Corrupt Practices, http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/
default/files/Global%20Witness%20memo%20on%20Glencore%27s%20secretive%20dealings%20in%20the%20Demo-
cratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo_1.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2013).
11 The OECD defines IFFs as funds whose origin, transfer or use is contrary to international and/or national laws, inclu-
ding the movement of money that has been illegally earned. See OECD (2011). According to the OECD, illicit financial flows 
include flows from (a) licit sources, i.e. from abusive transfer pricing, from tax evasion, and (partly) from trade mispricing; 
and (b) from illicit sources, i.e. money laundering, bribery, and also (in part) from trade mispricing.
12 Data on financial flows is often scant and aggregated, of highly differing quality, and unequally covering the same 
aspects. Differing concepts and definitions, as well as methodologies and underlying assumptions in data processing, 
moreover, further complicate analytical work and dialogue as to the magnitude and primary features of IFFs. See, for 
example, AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA (2012).
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and 980 billion.13 A study by the African development bank (Afdb), oecd, 
United nations development Programme (UndP) and the Un economic com-
mission for Africa calculates that, as of 2011, the incurred net losses (in terms 
of stock) of sub-saharan African countries due to capital flight that occurred 
from 1970-2008 totalled Usd 700 billion. For switzerland, as a financial flow 
destination, the berne declaration and Alliance sud – a consortium of ngos 
– estimate that by the end of 2011, flows of capital flight from developing and 
middle-income countries may amount to Usd 490 billion (stock). the interest 
on this capital alone would account for more than twice the amount of annual 
swiss odA (Alliance sud, berne declaration, 2012).
the 2012 edition of the African Economic Outlook illustrates the potential 
impact these funds could have on development (in terms of poverty reduction) 
were they to be invested in Africa: 
‘if flight capital had been reinvested in Africa with the same level or pro-
ductivity as that of actual investment, the rate of poverty reduction could 
have increased by 4-6 percentage points a year, on average, over the period 
from 2000 to 2008. African countries could then as a group have reached the 
Millennium development goal of halving the 1990 level of poverty by 2015.’ 
(Afdb et al., 2012, 73)
Moreover, the study concludes that, since the actors involved in capital 
flight are both within and outside the resource-rich countries, international 
cooperation is crucial to reversing the flow of African capital back towards 
the continent.
while it is impossible, at this point, to identify the share of capital flight or 
iFFs specifically related to extractive industries and the commodities trade, 
the figures provided above are an indication that a significant portion of the 
revenues derived from natural resources are not retained by resource-rich 
developing countries. this subject is the focus of debates within internatio-
nal organisations, resource-rich countries, regional economic communities, 
the finance and development ministries of donor countries, and civil society 
groups. A recent academic study facilitated by the world bank estimates the 
minimal amount of this type of transaction by multinational enterprises across 
all sectors to be at least Usd 160 billion annually. it further concludes that 
transfer pricing is particularly common among multinational enterprises in 
extractive industries and commodity trade.14
Ultimately, the debate revolves around the driving forces and institutional 
frameworks that constitute the operational context for iFFs at both the national 
and international levels:
13 For data from NGOs, see Kar, D. and D. Cartwright-Smith (2009) and Tax Justice Network, which include older data on 
Switzerland. http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=103 (accessed on 6 May 2013). The Swiss federal 
authorities have no estimates of likely (legal and illegal) international financial flows, according to the Federal Council in 
its answer to the parliamentary question 11.4096.
14 Reuter, P. (2012). For a detailed presentation of methods of Transfer-Pricing, see p. 288ff. and Part III.
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•	 the responsibilities of multinational corporations, their business models 
and practices
•	 the role of governments in resource-rich developing countries (i.e. fiscal 
regimes, good governance, land tenure)
•	 the role of countries that receive these financial flows (i.e. taxation laws, 
oversight of financial markets, international cooperation between tax 
authorities)
in a path-breaking book, Paul collier illustrates the development policy 
challenges posed by these financial flows to resource-rich developing countries, 
and the importance of sound institutions, through an interesting comparison. 
he writes, ‘for a newly resource-rich country to benefit from its newfound 
wealth, it must possess the governance levels and institutional quality equi-
valent to Portugal in the 1980s. in the alternative scenario, oil and mineral 
wealth increases the prospect of plunder and mismanagement.’ (collier, 2007)
BOX 2: Resource-rich Developing Countries – Success Stories and Failures
In terms of the successful use of natural resources, one may find a number of positive as well as 
negative examples. angola may be understood as a negative example. From 2007-2010, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) found usD 32 billion in unaccounted government funds, a sum equivalent to a 
quarter of angola’s annual GDP (IMF, 2011). similarly, copper-rich zambia provides yet another example 
where the proportion of profits remaining in the country bears no resemblance whatsoever to the 
enormous earnings generated by its copper production. as shown in Grant Thornton’s audit of the Mopani 
copper mines (counter balance, 2011), zambia has suffered from large-scale tax evasion manifest in 
inexplicable increases in certain operating costs, losses carried forward for 10 years to secure corporate 
tax exemptions and largely undervalued copper and cobalt exports to switzerland (which are ‘exported‘ 
on paper only, before being resold by swiss-based companies). Were zambia to actually receive the same 
price for its copper that switzerland receives for the copper and intermediate goods derived from these 
exports, zambia’s GDP would virtually double.15 a natural resource success story, in contrast, is that of 
botswana and the exploitation of its diamond deposits. between the late 1960s and 2000, botswana has 
recorded an average growth rate of 7 per cent per annum,16 and life expectancy has risen by over 17 years. 
Ghana and Malaysia represent other positive examples.
15 Alex Cobham´s (Christian Aid) presentation at ‘Trade Mispricing’ session, Task Force on Financial Integrity and Econo-
mic Development Annual Conference 2011, Paris, France, 7 October 2011, www.financialtaskforce.org.
16 President Festus Mogae, Botswana’s Development Experience, lecture given at the Institute of Development Stu-
dies, Sussex University, 21st February 2005, p. 2, as reproduced at SARPN http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001114/
P1229-Botswana_February2005.pdf (accessed on April 24, 2013).
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2.2. The Commodity Trading Industry in Switzerland
what is the significance of the swiss-based commodity trading industry, 
its public perception, and its regulatory context?  with regard to a number of 
important aspects, the amount of data available on both individual firms and 
the industry overall is thin.17 nevertheless, it is fair to state that, following 
the recent establishment of numerous large trading firms, the sector is on 
the rise. Although the simultaneous heterogeneity and opacity of this sector 
makes it difficult to put an exact figure on its significance, its contribution 
to switzerland’s gdP is likely comparable to that of the machinery industry. 
economists estimate that the rapid rise of transit trade alone was responsible 
for some 50 per cent of economic growth in 2010, with commodities accounting 
for 94 per cent of transit trade in the data assembled by the swiss national 
bank (swiss national bank, 2012, 37).
A fundamental characteristic of the swiss commodity-trading sector is its 
involvement in so-called transit or merchant trade. the volume of commo-
dities financed, organised and taxed through switzerland far exceeds swiss 
consumption needs. even though contracts are concluded, ships chartered and 
goods dispatched by swiss offices, with the notable exception of gold, which 
is imported to switzerland in vast amounts, processed and re-exported. the 
goods never enter swiss territory. in contrast to trade within national mar-
kets or between governments, trade on the ‘free’ commodity markets, which 
includes direct sales through commodity trading companies and commodity 
exchanges, is financed primarily by either publically-owned cantonal banks 
or specialised banks with offices in switzerland.
recent analyses, such as Commodities: Switzerland’s Most Dangerous Busi-
ness, published by the berne declaration (2011a), present, for the first time, 
information on the scope of the commodity trading sector and the regulatory 
role played by the swiss state, to a wider audience. the following facts are 
significant in this regard: swiss-based firms control 15 – 25 per cent of the 
global trade in commodities, including fossil fuels, minerals and agricultural 
commodities. Measured in terms of commercial value, this business amounts 
to revenues of Usd 3000 billion annually. the commodity trading industry 
has grown rapidly over the last 10 years. due to the fact that the majority of 
commodities never physically enter switzerland, this is not directly reflected 
in the country’s foreign trade figures. transit trade, one portion of the business, 
is nevertheless recorded in the balance of payments data. in the last decade, 
the net income of transit trade has undergone an enormous fifteen-fold growth, 
primarily as a result of the growing commodity trading industry. About a dozen 
companies, headquartered around lakes zug and geneva, make switzerland 
a heavy weight in this industry.18 several swiss-based commodity-trading 
companies also rank among the largest mining firms, and are involved in oil 
and agricultural production. Xstrata, for example, is the world’s fourth largest 
17 In May 2012, the Swiss Government tasked three ministries to elaborate a background report. The report has been 
completed in March 2013 (Editor’s Note: see http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=48319 
and report on http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/30136.pdf, accessed on September 15, 
2013).
18 Glencore, Trafiguar, Xstrata, Vitol, Mercuria, Gunvor, Litasco, ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Dreyfus. For details of their busi-
ness portfolios see Berne Declaration (2011a).
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operator of mines. Fossil fuels figure strongly in the commodity industry in 
switzerland. Measured in terms of volume, companies resident in switzerland 
control over 30 per cent of the market trade in petroleum. companies situated 
on the shores of lake geneva control an even larger, at times dominant, share 
of the trade in agricultural commodities: 35 per cent in the case of grain and 
oilseeds and 50 per cent in the case of sugar and coffee.
how do these trading companies impact governance and development out-
comes in producer countries? these trading companies engage in high-level 
transactions, including the purchase of states’ shares of petroleum or mine-
ral production, with the governments of developing countries. these deals 
directly affect the level of revenue received by producing countries. some 
experts argue that the trading company industry in developing countries is 
subject to insufficient transparency and oversight (gillies, 2012).
it is questions such as the one above, in combination with concerns about 
the ability of large trading companies to influence commodity prices that 
have prompted the growing public interest in the commodity problematic in 
general and in the business practices of swiss-based firms and the role of the 
swiss regulatory framework more specifically.
3. International Discussions and Policies of Selected Countries
there are currently more than a dozen international initiatives dealing 
with issues of resource extraction, agricultural production, and the com-
modities trade. Many countries and regional organisations, such as, for ins-
tance, norway and the european Union, are formulating their own resource 
strategies.
international debates and the positions of other countries with respect to 
improving the governance of commodity revenue are relevant for a number 
of reasons, thus raising the question as to if, and if so, in which processes 
and to what extent, switzerland should get further involved. there is also the 
question, furthermore, of the effectiveness of existing initiatives. At the very 
least, the international debate facilitates the establishment of a best practices 
understanding of appropriate policies and concrete measures and may thus 
inform the formulation of switzerland’s own development policy.
3.1. International Initiatives –  
A Growing Consensus as to How to Address Challenges
A series of important international initiatives and processes have 
consistently demanded greater transparency and accountability in the com-
modity sector.
within the Un, the most relevant discussions take place in the context of 
macroeconomic policy issues (a mandate of the second committee of the general 
Assembly), where a resolution on Transparency, Sustainable Development and 
Natural Resources is currently under discussion (grynspan, 2012), and under the 
auspices of the global compact. Also of relevance is the much broader debate 
on development financing. with the overarching goal of mobilizing financial 
resources for development, this holistic agenda addresses domestic resource 
mobilization in developing countries, Fdi, international trade, international 
financial and technical cooperation for development, as well as debt and other 
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systemic issues. Among the central objectives are fiscal reform – improving 
tax collection, combating tax evasion, strengthening technical assistance and 
enhancing international cooperation in addressing international tax matters 
such as double taxation – combating the various factors that contribute to iFFs, 
and the promotion of corporate social responsibility. commitments in this 
regard were formalized in the 2002 Monterrey consensus of the international 
conference on Financing for development and later reaffirmed in the doha 
declaration, which has come to constitute a major reference point for contem-
porary international development cooperation. these positions have since 
been reaffirmed in several resolutions adopted by the Un general Assembly.
specific initiatives often combine the enforcement of business principles 
with institutional capacity building in resource-rich developing countries. 
other programmes and initiatives focus on the integrity of financial transac-
tions, including the role of tax regimes in recipient and exporting countries. 
existing initiatives can be grouped into the following four categories:19 (1) 
initiatives intended to promote contract and revenue transparency; (2) cer-
tification instruments (‘commodity-specific tracking regimes’); (3) instru-
ments to promote broad governance standards; and (4) non-resource-specific 
initiatives aimed at promoting transparency and integrity in international 
financial transactions.
Among the most important initiatives, which include the legislation of 
mandatory transparency rules for multinational enterprises and various efforts 
to promote transparency in international financial transactions, are: 
•	 Us dodd-Frank wall street reform and consumer Protection Act, sections 
1502 and 1504
•	 eU transparency directive (2004/109/ec), Accounting directives (78/660/
eec and 83/349/eec) and capital requirement directive (crd iV)
•	 extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti)
•	 oecd global Forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax 
Purposes
•	 world bank/Un stolen Asset recovery (stAr) initiative
these initiatives and actions demonstrate a growing consensus that global 
commodity markets influence the economic prospects of many developing 
countries and, correspondingly, must be addressed. transparency, in particu-
lar, has risen to the forefront of global responses, and it appears that disclosure 
practices will be deepened and broadened in the near future, through the 
strengthening of eiti and the diffusion of mandatory reporting requirements 
within the Us, eU and beyond.
19  For the most important initiatives, see list and description in annex.
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3.2. Initiatives by Resource-rich Developing Countries:  
The Case of The African Mining Vision
the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) was adopted by African heads of state at 
the February 2009 African Union summit. As a homegrown strategy to create 
a ‘transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to 
underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development,’ 
the AMV represents Africa’s own response to the paradox of the ‘resource 
curse’ (isg, 2011, 1). it challenges the mining sector’s habitual dominance of 
African economies, seeking to use Africa’s natural resources to transform the 
continent’s social and economic development process. its central premise is the 
need for a shift from Africa’s historic ‘enclaved’ status as an exporter of cheap 
raw materials towards the development of manufacturing and knowledge-
based service sectors.
the AMV will serve as the framework for African states, regional organi-
sations and the African Union for the efficient utilization and management 
of Africa’s mineral resources. the AMV is founded on the following funda-
mental objectives:
•	 Promoting good governance and improved transparency of the mineral 
sector, with increased benefits stemming from mineral assets for local 
communities and citizens; 
•	 optimising revenues and mineral rents management, particularly through 
the reform of mining legislation, including the renegotiations of contracts 
and establishment of a framework to address tax avoidance, capital flight 
and tax havens, with a view toward maximising revenues from highly 
profitable industries during times of high commodity prices; 
•	 Promoting increased geological knowledge and corresponding benefits 
from mineral resources;
•	 developing a diversified and globally competitive mineral industry, which 
contributes to broad economic and social growth through the creation of 
companies with strong economic linkages;
•	 Mobilising mining and infrastructure investment, with a view towards ‘dis-
enclaving’ the mining industry and investing in inclusive infrastructure, 
creating opportunities for industrial linkages, notably through improving 
private-public collaboration and bolstering the capacity of financial systems 
and regional economic communities to facilitate cross border investment 
and establish regional capital and commodity markets; 
•	 harnessing the potential of small-scale mining to improve living standards 
and integrate artisanal producers into the rural and national economy; 
•	 Promoting sustainable development, particularly environmentally and 
socially responsible mining, which includes communities and all other 
stakeholders; 
•	 improving human and institutional capacities, with special emphasis on 
innovation, research and development.
in september 2007, an international study group (isg) was established to 
review Africa’s mineral regimes. the newest report of the isg analyses in detail 
the local conditions and effects of resource extraction and trade, and makes 
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suggestions for improvement (isg, 2011). the report explores a number of 
important issues and concludes with a comprehensive list of key policy consi-
derations, including: challenges emanating from the environmental, human 
and social effects of mining; the performance of regulation mechanisms in 
Africa; public sector management of mineral revenues; the need for public 
sector reform in support of mineral-based growth; and recent developments 
in international trade threaten to significantly constrain Africa’s capacity to 
realize these development objectives.
3.3. Setting the Agenda and Policy Standards:  
Norway and the European Union
For years, norway has played a prominent role in international discus-
sions focusing on issues of governance and capacity building in developing 
countries. in 2008, the government established a broad-based, expert commis-
sion on capital Flight from developing countries, which produced a report on 
Tax Havens and Development in June 2009. building on the report’s recom-
mendations, many proposals aimed at improving transparency have since 
been implemented, while others remain under consideration.
Among the programmes carried out by the norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or civil society groups (supported through official channels) are:
•	 Oil for Development Programme: innovative programme playing a pionee-
ring role in matters concerning development finance, capacity building, 
environmental considerations, and technical cooperation.
•	 Taxation for Development Programme: Programme of the Ministry for 
development geared towards meeting the needs of developing countries.
•	 Capital for Development: one-year dialogue project aimed at raising aware-
ness of issues relating to capital flight and development through engagement 
with parliamentarians, the media and the general public.
•	 Task Force on Financial Integrity & Economic Development: in coordina-
tion with the government of spain, a task Force funded by the norwegian 
Agency for development cooperation (norAd).
•	 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (eiti): eiti secretariat hosted 
by norway, as its first oecd country-member.
•	 Revenue Watch Institute and Global Financial Integrity: long-term partner-
ship with key civil society actors, focussed on tax and commodity issues.
in a similar manner, the eU has also taken a leading role in addressing the 
commodity trade issue on a number of fronts, such as the business activities of 
multinational firms, the promotion of good governance in developing countries 
– including the discussion on smart conditionality (‘more for more’) – and the 
reform of trade and tax legislation and cooperation.
development policy aspects were addressed specifically in the Conclusions 
on Tackling the Challenges on Raw Materials and in Commodity Markets report 
published by the eU’s competitiveness council (council of the european 
Union, 2011). essential measures required to achieve development policy 
objectives were identified as:
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•	 greater transparency in the resource sector through the implementation 
of eiti provisions, the launch of other initiatives, the publication of the 
financial figures of commodity-trading companies, the establishment of a 
country-by-country reporting mechanism for multinational companies, 
the creation of international financial reporting standards (iFrs) for the 
industry as a whole, and provision for the monitoring of third-country 
legislation.
•	 the uniform application of higher business practice standards for compa-
nies active in developing countries and domiciled both in and outside the 
eU and the promotion of corporate social responsibility and other relevant 
codes of conduct.
•	 A trade policy that works in conjunction with development policy such 
that development needs of individual countries, particularly the least 
developed countries (ldc), are taken into consideration.20
these recommendations21 were taken-up again, in part, by the eU commis-
sion in october 2011, in conjunction with a path-breaking proposal to expand 
the EU Transparency, Accounting and Capital Requirement Directives. these 
proposals would require all eU-listed or large unlisted oil, gas, mining and 
logging companies to disclose their payments to all governments on a country-
by-country and project-by-project basis. the proposed legislation would build 
on a similar law adopted in the United states in July 2010, the US Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (see section 3.1).
4. Current Discussions in Switzerland
the commodity industry has attracted not only the attention of the swiss 
media but also became a subject of federal political interest in 2011, when a 
great number of related parliamentary requests were issued.22 At its annual 
press conference in February 2012, moreover, the swiss small and Medium 
entreprises business Federation (Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband - sgV) 
called upon the Federal council to develop an ‘interdisciplinary resource 
strategy.’ their paper, entitled Strengthening of Commodity Policy Perspec-
tives in Development Policy seeks to link swiss development cooperation with 
privileged access to natural resources (sgV, 2012).
the various 2011 parliamentary requests regarding the commodity trade are 
roughly arranged around the following issues: Access to strategic resources 
20 That said, in promoting trade policy reform, the Council simultaneously underlined the EU’s willingness to pursue ‘raw 
materials diplomacy’, meaning that the EU intends to reinforce its trade strategy with an open campaign against export 
restrictions, to the extent that it will work with other international institutions to foster dialogue for a better understanding 
of the impact of export restrictions.
21 For a critical appraisal of this report from a Swiss and development policy perspective see Niggli, P. (2011). The article 
examines the resource policies of the EU and draws a comparison with Switzerland’s resource policy. In Niggli’s view, the 
resource policy of the EU is a ‘blunt instrumentalisation of development aid with the aim of furthering its own economic 
self-interest.’
22 Parliamentary requests are requests by individual members of the two chambers for action and information on par-
ticular topics, and include so-called motions (for legislative action), postulates, interpellations, and questions. Details on 
http://www.parlament.ch/e/wissen/taetigkeiten/parlinstrvorstoesse/pages/default.aspx (accessed on 6 May 2013).
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and a secure food supply, from the classical perspective of the provision of 
essential goods.23
the role and reputation of switzerland as a host of multinational enterprises 
and as an international trading centre,24 delving into sub-themes such as: 
•	 Money laundering25
•	 taxation26
•	 Agricultural commodities and food security in the context of international 
trade27
•	 international trade and embargo policy.28
•	 good corporate governance standards for multinational firms (not resource 
specific).
•	 business and human rights.29
•	 Financial reporting standards (country-by-country reporting).30
in its report on the key aspects of its foreign policy agenda during the 
2012-2015 legislative period, the Federal council acknowledged the strategic 
importance of the commodity trade for switzerland. At the same time, the 
council identified several risks associated with the commodity trade: potential 
damage to the reputation of the country, speculation and price fluctuation, 
unlawful business practices, taxation issues, and access to strategic resources. 
to ensure that such potential risks are identified early on, the Federal council 
recommended that switzerland develop and implement a coherent foreign 
policy on this topic.
23  Ip Germann 11.3929, Sicherung der Rohstoffversorgung für die Schweizer Industrie; Ip Füglistaller 11.3905, Sicherung 
der Rohstoffversorgung für die Schweizer Industrie; Bericht des Bundesrates, Nahrungsmittelkrise, Rohstoff- und Ressourcen-
knappheit, 2009.
24 Po Fässler-Osterwalder 11.3803, Die Rolle der Schweiz als Sitzstaat von Rohstoff-Handelsfirmen; Mo Leuenberger Obe-
rholzer 11.3840, Rohstoffhandelsfirmen regulieren.
25 Mo Wyss 11.4161, Keine Geldwäsche im Handel mit Rohwaren auf eigene Rechnung; Mo Leutenegger Oberholzer 
11.3118, Ausdehnung des Anwendungsbereiches des Geldwäschereigesetzes auf den Handel mit wertvollen Gütern; Ip Wyss 
12.3138, Dubiose Vergabe von Minenlizenzen in Kongo. Rolle der Firma Glencore und des IWF.
26 Ip Fässler-Osterwalder 11.4096, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen mit Entwicklungsländern; Mo Fässler-Osterwalder 
11.4097, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und Verstärkung der guten Unternehmensführung; Mo Kiener Nellen 12.3612, 
Steuerinformationsabkommen mit Offshore-Finanzzentren; Ip Fehr 11.4065, Steuerhinterziehungsgelder aus Indien auf 
Schweizer Bankkonten; Po Fehr 11.3858, Reputationsrisiken der Unternehmensbesteuerung.
27 Mo Sommaruga 11.4167, Lutte contre la spéculation sur terres agricoles et les produits alimentaires de base; Ip Graf 
11.3385, Landgrabbing. Was tut die Schweiz dagegen?; Ip Bourgeois 11.3822, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Mehr Hilfe für 
nachhaltige Landwirtschaft und Ernährungssicherheit; Ip Müller 11.3344, Anstieg der Nahrungsmittelpreise. Strategie.
28 Ip Sommaruga 11.4187, Ankauf- und Transportverbot für Erdöl aus Syrien wirksam durchsetzen.
29 Ip Sommaruga 11.4169, Principes directeurs de l’OCDE pour les multinationales. Quelle volonté politique?; Ip von Graf-
fenried 11.4083, Responsabilité des entreprises en matière de droits de l’ homme. Application des lignes directrices de l’ONU 
en Suisse?; Ip Bourgeois 11.3489, Transparence au niveau des placements alternatifs.
30 Ip Fehr 11.3859, Etablissement des comptes par pays. La Suisse accuse-t-elle un retard dans ce domaine?; Ip Simoneschi-
Cortesi 10.3364, OECD-Leitsätze für multinationale Unternehmen. Country by Country.
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in 2012, the wave of parliamentary requests massively increased. 31 Mir-
roring this increase in interest, a petition entitled Corporate Justice – Rules 
for Business. Rights for People, signed by approximately 135,000 people, was 
submitted to Parliament and the Federal council in June 2012.32
in december 2011, the Federal council declared its willingness to commis-
sion a comprehensive analysis of the switzerland’s role as an international 
hub of commodity trading, issuing a mandate to draft a background report on 
existing knowledge and current policies. when complete, this comprehensive 
overview would also serve to frame the 2011 raw Materials strategy of the 
Federal department of economic Affairs and several Foreign economic Policy 
reports (in particular those issued in 2008) on the topic of strategic resources. 
notably, these economic Policy reports consider neither the question of sus-
tainability nor the equity of north-south relations. From a development policy 
perspective, the following activities are particularly worthy of mention: 
•	 support, assistance and monitoring of various activities of the oecd via 
participation in the informal task Force on tax and development (in 
addition to a financial contribution to the oecd Programme on tax and 
development), membership in the oecd global Forum on transparency 
and exchange of information for tax Purposes, and implementation of the 
oecd due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of Minerals 
from conflict-Affected and high-risk Areas.
•	 swiss participation in the extractive industries transparency initiative 
(eiti).
•	 support of the iMF Managing natural resource wealth topical trust Fund 
and the world bank extractive industries technical Advisory Facility 
(eitAF).33
•	 support of the world bank stolen Assets recovery (stAr) initiative and 
the international centre for Assets recovery (icAr) in basel.
•	 implementation of the Voluntary guidelines on the responsible governance 
of tenure of land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of national Food 
security.
•	 support of the roundtable of sustainable biofuels towards the development 
of voluntary standards for biofuel production.
•	 Active involvement in, and support of, the Un global compact, which 
promotes corporate social and environmental standards and responsibility.
•	 bilateral support to burkina Faso, ghana, Mozambique, and Peru on matters 
of tax reform.
31 Among them (unti mid-2012), see Ip Sommaruga 12.3517, Durch Tochterfirmen von multinationalen Unterneh-
men begangene Menschenrechts- und Umweltverletzungen; Ip Seydoux-Christe 12.3499, Durch ausländische Toch-
terfirmen von Schweizer Unternehmen begangene Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Zugang der Opfer zur Justiz; Ip Ingold 
12.3449, Verantwortlichkeit von international tätigen Firmen mit Sitz in der Schweiz; Ip Moser 12.3520, Soziale und 
ökologische Unternehmensverantwortung. Selbstregulierung oder verpflichtende Regeln; Ip Haller Vannini 2.3456, 
Integration der ‘guiding principles’ von John Ruggie in die Bundesverwaltung; Po 12.3503; Ip Graffenried 12.3627, 
Eine Ruggie-Strategie für die Schweiz; Ip Wermuth 12.3442, Ein- und Ausfuhr von Gold. Offenlegung der Statistik.
32 Swiss Coorporate Justice Campaign website: http://www.corporatejustice.ch/en/ (accessed on 6 May 2013).
33 World Bank, Oil, Gas and Mining Unit, webpage ‘Extractive Industries Technical Advisory Facility’, http://web.world-
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,contentMDK:22366721~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSit
ePK:336930,00.html (accessed on 6 May 2013).
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5. Conclusions on Development Policy Options for and in Switzerland
in contrast to the state of affairs even a decade ago, much is now being done 
to improve the governance of resource revenues. A plethora of measures have 
been adopted, most under the auspices of a broad good governance agenda, 
emphasizing transparency and accountability through voluntary participa-
tory processes. several major donors, such as norway, the Us and the eU, 
have played key roles in supporting the emergence and application of these 
measures, attempting to set norms that benefit local populations in resource-
rich developing countries while avoiding harming the interests of their own 
companies. Most official development agencies, however, take the broader 
approach of building government capacity and (on a smaller scale) consoli-
dating the input and participation of civil society organizations.
with legislation under way in the eU and pending implementation in the 
Us, 2013 may become a watershed year for revenue transparency in extractive 
industries and the commodities trade. the european Parliament is expected 
to vote in 2013 on a final text requiring country-by-country reporting from 
eU-listed (and also, potentially, large, private) oil, gas and mining companies. 
similarly, the Us securities and exchange commission is also expected to 
complete its work on additional regulatory provisions related to the imple-
mentation of the dodd-Frank Act in 2013. the g20, moreover, is actively 
addressing issues of transparency, anti-corruption and asset recovery, and 
further action by its Anti-corruption working group is expected. overall, 
these events are likely to draw the attention of policy makers and legislators 
to these issues, particularly with respect to the internationalization of these 
standards. companies listed in the Us and eU will, in all likelihood, seek to 
globalize these standards in order to reduce their competitive disadvantage. 
this will shift the spotlight to jurisdictions that lack reporting requirements.
in addition, the eiti is currently undergoing a process of reform that will 
culminate in a significant strengthening of its rules in early 2013.34 this 
process was initiated following the recognition that the minimal levels of 
revenue transparency required by existing regulations have not sufficiently 
mitigated the governance and development challenges faced by many resource-
rich countries.
what are the implications of this changing international environment for 
swiss international development cooperation? what, in this context, is its 
most effective contribution to the promotion of the sustainable use of natural 
resources?
switzerland possesses specific strengths and limitations that determine 
the design of coherent development policy and related targeted interventions 
in this field. these include:
•	 expertise in the commodity trade, characterised by: (a) limited technical 
knowledge about the extraction of fossil fuels and minerals; (b) some reco-
gnised expertise in specific areas of international agricultural research; and 
(c) international leadership in the ‘know-how’ of the trade of raw materials, 
34 For more information, refer to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Strategy Review, http://eiti.org/
about/strategy-review (accessed on April 29, 2013).
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due to the large number of swiss-based companies specialising in this and 
related fields (logistics, finance and insurance matters).
•	 the widespread local presence of swiss international development coopera-
tion in virtually all commodity-exporting developing countries. that said, 
however, it must be acknowledged that on the ground, swiss development 
cooperation often possesses limited, if not actually minimal, independent 
leverage.
•	 swiss participation in selected international initiatives and processes, as 
well as its membership in multilateral development organizations, such 
as the Un, the oecd, the world bank, the iMF and various regional deve-
lopment banks.
given these capacities, a logical overall swiss international development 
cooperation natural resource strategy would be the promotion of public poli-
cies in developing and developed countries that require greater transparency 
and accountability at all levels, on the basis of basic international legal and 
business standards, as well as fundamental human rights.
to be effective, swiss international development cooperation should 
therefore:
•	 support poor, resource-exporting developing countries in improving their 
governance with respect to both public institutions and non-state actors.
•	 selectively but pro-actively participate in international initiatives to pro-
mote the sustainable use of natural resources.
•	 support the design and further refinement of the swiss regulatory fra-
mework in so far as relevant to the nexus between commodity issues and 
the legitimate needs and interests of developing countries.
through a balanced approach of this nature, swiss development and foreign 
economic policies can help ensure that poor, resource-exporting countries 
succeed in retaining a greater portion of the profits earned from resource 
extraction and the commodity trade and, in turn, use these profits to benefit 
their population. in doing so, switzerland would expand its contribution to 
international efforts to address a truly global challenge.
As such, the conditions required for good governance in the poor, resource-
exporting partner countries of swiss development cooperation should be 
promoted. this would notably include: (a) strengthening state institutions 
with the goal of achieving better mobilization of domestic resources and the 
professional management of the expenditure side; and (b) measures to advance 
transparency and accountability with regard to the conditions, arrangements 
and agreements related to resource extraction, processing and trade, including 
the origins and use of financial resources generated by commodity production 
and trade. Activities on the ground could include:
•	 technical support to governments (with respect, for instance, to draf-
ting policy and legislation, contract negotiation, regulations and revenue 
management).
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•	 elaboration and encouragement of good practices (to improve governance 
in resource-rich countries to multiply the efficacy and returns of natural 
resource exploitation).
•	 strengthening the demand for good governance by supporting accountabi-
lity actors such as parliaments, the media and civil society in monitoring 
and demanding improvements in the governance of extractive sectors.
•	 work with communities to address environmental and social impacts and 
maximize economic and non-economic gains for locals.
in terms of on-going international initiatives and multilateral negotiations, 
swiss authorities would therefore need to clarify:
•	 which initiatives are (a) most relevant, and (b) most likely to increase in 
effectiveness following swiss support? it remains to be decided which, if 
any, additional standard-setting processes, technically oriented initiatives 
and key actors should receive support. this could include processes within 
the Un framework, the oecd, and bretton woods institutions, but also 
those carried out by civil society organisations, either alone or in concert 
with governments.
•	 how to best reach the goal of ensuring unhindered and least-cost access to 
natural resources without compromising development policy objectives and 
legitimate interests of development countries? isolated proposals to make 
development aid conditional upon the abolition of restrictions on access 
to natural resources are common today. From a development perspective, 
the imposition of conditionalities and the abolition of restrictions (inclu-
ding taxes) on the export of raw materials from resource-rich developing 
countries remains a matter of substantial debate and contestation.
with regard to the regulatory framework of switzerland, public policies 
would need to address issues of transparency and accountability, in addition 
to the business practices of multinational companies. Most controversially, 
the framework must determine the conditions under which legally binding 
standards, rather than principles, guidelines, and arrangements, would be 
most effective. correspondingly, specific concerns of this nature would be, 
among others: 
•	 transparency in the activities of commodity companies doing business 
in and with developing countries. this refers to country-by-country and 
project-by-project level disclosure of payments to governments, in a manner 
similar to that currently implemented in the Us and the eU.
•	 the adherence to minimum standards of corporate social responsibility 
and respect for human rights by companies engaged in investment, trade 
and extraction, in developing countries. in concrete terms, this would 
mean either the national implementation of international standards issued 
by various Un bodies and the oecd or the implementation of provisions 
similar to those of states whose requirements exceed the average in this 
regard.
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•	 improvement in the cooperation between oecd countries and developing 
countries in regards to the exchange of information with respect to taxation 
issues, such as the use of double taxation and tax information exchange 
agreements.
•	 combatting corruption, money laundering, tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
related topics include transparency with respect to beneficial ownership, 
due diligence rules and the oversight of financial market actors.
Against this background, the federal offices responsible for the policy for-
mulation and implementation of swiss international development cooperation 
should continue to actively participate in current discussions and efforts to 
address the challenges related to natural resource governance.
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AnneX
Key International Initiatives and Legislative Efforts to Strengthen 
Resource Governance and Promote Sustainable Natural Resource Use35
Contract and Revenue Transparency
•	 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): calls upon governments 
to publish payments received by extractive companies.
•	 US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec-
tion 1504: requires all oil, mining and gas companies registered with the 
Us securities and exchange commission to report their payments to all 
governments on a country-by-country and project-by-project basis.
•	 EU Transparency Directive (2004/109/ec), Accounting Directives (78/660/
eec and 83/349/eec) and Capital Requirement Directive (cPd4): expansion 
of current directives proposed by the eU commission in 2011, resulting in 
legislation similar to the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act that requires all eU-listed or large unlisted oil, gas, mining 
and logging companies to disclose their payments to all governments on a 
country-by-country and project-by-project basis.
•	 International Financial Reporting Standards (international Accounting 
standard board): establishes global disclosure and reporting standards, 
including specific measures, for the extractive industries.
•	 International Financial Institutions (IFIs): the world bank’s international 
Finance corporation (iFc) requires its extractive industry clients to disclose 
key material payments made to host governments as a condition of its len-
ding. Additionally, in 2011, the iFc revised its sustainability Framework to 
require contract disclosures from all oil, gas and mining industry clients. 
other iFis, such as the european bank for reconstruction and develop-
ment, which released a new draft Mining strategy in 2012, may implement 
similar transparency safeguards.
•	 Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (iMF): serves as quasi-
audits for domestic authorities and risk assessment tools for investors and 
lenders.
•	 Publish What You Pay: campaign launched in 2002 by a coalition of 60 
ngos calling for better management of public revenues in order to address 
poverty and good governance in resource-rich countries. it now has over 
650 member organizations. the campaign is supported by the open society 
institute, which, in turn, supports the revenue watch institute, a spe-
cialized organisation on extractive industries, also partially funded by 
governments.
•	 IMF Managing Natural Resource Wealth Topical Trust Fund: enables natu-
ral-resource-rich low and lower-middle income countries to derive the 
maximum benefit from their oil, gas and mineral resources by providing 
technical assistance to draft effective economic policy and build adminis-
trative capacities.
35  For a more detailed analysis see Le Billon (2011).
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Certification Instruments (‘Commodity-specific Tracking Regimes’)
•	 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: Voluntary governance scheme 
created in 2002 wherein participant countries forego the trade conflict 
diamonds.
•	 US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, section 
1502: seeks to end the illegal exploitation and trade of conflict minerals 
from the eastern democratic republic of the congo (drc) through the 
application of due diligence processes.
•	 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Provides management recom-
mendations for responsible global mineral supply chains to help compa-
nies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their 
mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices.
Broad Governance Standards
•	 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: outlines general 
human rights due diligence obligations for companies and special due 
diligence for conflict zones.
•	 Natural Resource Charter: twelve principles, created by a group of acade-
mics led by Paul collier, aimed at promoting accountable management, 
robust fiscal regimes and the sustainable use of resources.
•	 UN Global Compact: encourages businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable 
and socially responsible policies and to report on their implementation.
•	 Committee on World Food Security: endorsement of a set of far-reaching 
global guidelines entitled the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of Natio-
nal Food Security.
Other Non-resource-specific Intergovernmental Initiatives
•	 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: inter-governmental 
body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its member jurisdictions. the 
FAtF’s objective is to set standards and promote the effective implemen-
tation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other threats related to the integrity of 
the international financial system.
•	 Informal Task Force on Tax and Development: contributes to the oecd 
Programme on tax and development, which aims to strengthen tax sys-
tems in developing countries, establish effective transfer price regimes, 
increase financial data transparency in multinational enterprise reporting 
and counter international tax evasion by improving transparency and the 
exchange of information.
•	 OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes: ensures that all jurisdictions implement relevant international 
standards through a peer review mechanism.
•	 World Bank/UN Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: supports interna-
tional efforts to end safe havens for funds generated by criminal activities, 
including those generated in the extractive sectors in resource-dependent 
countries.
•	 International Tax Compact: initiative launched by the german Federal 
Ministry for economic cooperation and development with the aim of 
strengthening international cooperation to fight tax evasion and avoidance.
•	 World Bank/IFC Global Tax Simplification Programme: Provides technical 
assistance to developing countries on the issue of transfer pricing.
•	 African Tax Administration Forum: oecd-sponsored forum seeking to 
develop best practices among African tax administrations, including a 
transfer pricing project aimed at a more effective application of the ‘arm’s 
length principle’.
•	 Financial Accountability and Corporation Transparency Coalition (FACT): 
Us-based coalition of civil society organisations focussing on the repor-
ting obligations of Us-listed companies, now turning its attention to the 
extractive sector.
•	 Task Force on Financial Integrity & Economic Development: global coalition 
of civil society and more than 50 governments working together to advocate 
for greatly improved transparency and accountability in the global financial 
system.
•	 Open Government Partnership (OGP): international initiative aimed at secu-
ring concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, 
increase civic participation, fight corruption, and harness new technologies 
in order to promote open, effective and accountable government.
 | 177
Policy Debate Commodity Trading
reaction by Alexandra gillies, head of governance, revenue watch institute  
<http://www.revenuewatch.org/>.
crafting a strategic response to the  
commodity-development conundrum
A response to ‘commodities and switzerland:  
development Policy challenges and Policy options’  
by werner thut
the risks that accompany natural resource wealth are well-known. deve-
loping countries with large stores of oil, gas and mineral resources often fall 
victim to what is commonly known as the ‘resource curse.’ its symptoms vary 
from place to place, but frequently include persistent poverty, stagnant non-
resource sector growth, fiscal instability, unsustainable levels of spending, 
high levels of corruption and public institutions that are unaccountable to 
their citizens.
global efforts to respond to these problems have gathered pace since the 
late 1990s. At varying speeds, and to varying levels of success, governments, 
companies and civil society groups have developed approaches to the set 
of challenges associated with resource wealth and development. given the 
highly globalized and interconnected nature of the commodity sector (and the 
financial system into which commodity profits enter), diverse players share 
responsibility for the hardships that often accompany resource wealth, as 
well as for finding a solution.
the 2013 paper ‘commodities and switzerland: development Policy chal-
lenges and Policy options’, by werner thut of the swiss Agency for develop-
ment and cooperation, represents part of the swiss awakening to their own 
role in addressing these challenges. thut calls for a policy response that 
features three parts: supporting good governance in poor resource-exporting 
countries; participating in international initiatives; and, improving the swiss 
regulatory framework. these areas make sense as a general framework, but 
more urgency and more critical thinking are needed for swiss efforts to be 
more than just ‘window dressing’. 
in the comments below, i further defend that a targeted and strategic res-
ponse by the swiss government is needed now, and suggest two specific areas 
where they could make a tangible contribution, given the particular political 
economy that characterizes many resource-rich developing countries. these 
ideas build upon the foundational work of dr. thut, but aspire to challenge 
policymakers further to take the kind of action that can have an impact.
The urgent need for Swiss action
commodities can drive development if governments receive a fair share of 
revenues and utilize it well. getting this right is a massive and time-sensitive 
challenge. three hundred million citizens of resource- rich countries live in 
dire poverty, surviving on less than Usd 2 per day. eighty-five percent of these 
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people live in poorly governed countries (Kaufmann, 2012). Non-renewable 
resources, valued at over one trillion dollars per year, are being extracted at 
quickening rates from these countries. the longer it takes to improve gover-
nance, the fewer resources will be left to benefit citizens.
switzerland plays a major role in the global commodities market, as noted by 
werner thut. swiss companies, such as glencore, Vitol and trafigura, handle 
around 35 percent of the global physical oil trade and 60 percent of metals 
and minerals (bosley c. and M. Kolesnikova, 2013) – business that amounts to 
more than Usd 3 trillion.36 And business is booming. in the past decade, the 
top 20 commodity traders netted Usd 243 billion in total profits (up from just 
Usd 2 billion in 2000), and individual company profits outsized those of wall 
street’s largest banks (blas, 2013). As swiss companies cash in on resource 
wealth, the government must ensure that their business is not conducted at 
the expense of the developing countries where the raw materials are sourced.
the swiss government has explicitly stated that it faces increasing repu-
tational risks due to its large commodity trading sector. in their response, 
the government should not just carry out superficial steps to assuage their 
critics. these kind of symbolic measures feature heavily among the recom-
mendations contained in the much-anticipated March 2013 Federal council 
report on commodities (Federal department of Federal Affairs, 2013), which, 
in particular, calls for switzerland to support voluntary codes of conduct 
for trading companies and various international standards. issuing benign 
corporate guidelines or supporting a Un resolution do not constitute action. 
nor is a bit more aid sufficient, given the scale of the challenge around natural 
resources and development: in 2011, nigeria’s oil revenues were 60% larger 
than all foreign aid to the continent of Africa (neiti, 2013).37
in his paper, thut offers the beginning of an answer to the ‘what to do?’ 
question by recognizing the need for policy coherence. commodity markets 
(and the financial markets where commodity revenues end up) are highly 
globalized, so swiss policy must contain both domestic and externally-facing 
elements. below i describe two areas where timely and assertive action has a 
good chance at making a difference in the specific political economy realities 
that define resource-rich developing countries.
Power, profits and plunder
the academic literature around the so-called ‘resource curse’ describes the 
kind of citizen-state relations which commonly emerge in environments with 
large oil, gas or mining revenues and weak institutions.38 the term ‘rentier 
state’ is used to describe the political environment in which large resource 
rents accumulate in the state, usually in the hands of a few powerful indi-
viduals. the government does not rely on domestically generated revenues 
36 Al-Jazeera ‘The Giants of Commodity Trading’ (2012) http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthe-
cost/2012/09/2012927123919121653.html (Accessed on May 13, 2013).
37 Aid estimate from the OECD; Nigerian oil revenue figure from Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative – 
NEITI (2013) ‘Financial Audit: An Independent Report Assessing and Reconciling Financial Flows within Nigeria’s Oil and 
Gas Industry, 2009-2011.’ (Abuja: Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) http://eiti.org/files/NEITI-EITI-
Core-Audit-Report-Oil-Gas-2009-2011-310113-New_4.pdf (Accessed on May 13, 2013).
38 See the selected readings on the political economy of resource rich states in the references list below.
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and therefore has limited material interest in the prosperity of its people. 
the exercise of power involves allocating valuable industry assets (upstream 
licenses, service contracts, export permits, top industry positions, etc.) and 
resource revenues.
the resource-rich state (called the ‘rentier state’ by some scholars) domi-
nates at the expense of an independent private sector, and business tends to 
form a parasitic relationship with the wealthy state. Public officials often hold 
private interests in the extractive industries, generating conflicts of interest. 
Accountability actors including the media, parliament, opposition parties 
and civil society tend to be weak or co-opted into the rentier system, as do 
many checks on executive power like elections or audits. even international 
players, like the world bank and other donors, have limited influence given 
the financial and political autonomy enjoyed by the political elites and ample 
international competition among extractive industries to access their subsoil 
assets.
where such a political system is allowed to persist, the public will not 
receive maximum benefits of from its resource wealth. international actors, 
including switzerland, can work to increase the capacity of resource-rich 
government agencies (one of the Federal council report recommendations) 
and support voluntary international standards, but unless they tackle the 
imbalances of power which enable the persistence of the ‘rentier state’, impacts 
on the lives of citizens will remain limited. the two interventions mentioned 
below – transparency regulations and support for accountability actors – reflect 
areas where swiss action could make a real difference.
Transparency regulations for commodity traders
while not solely sufficient as a tool for realizing change, transparency does 
address one problem at the core of the rentier political economy: informational 
asymmetries. the political elite who control countries like Angola, the drc 
and turkmenistan hold onto important information in order to expand the 
ease and discretion with which they operate. these imbalances in information 
occur between the state and its citizens, as well as within government itself. 
in nigeria, for example, the government’s finance agencies and the national 
oil company regularly disagree on how much money one party owes to the 
other, with the former unable to access adequately detailed information about 
oil revenue generation. As a result, the public, accountability actors like jour-
nalists, and parliamentarians and even government officials cannot engage 
in an informed debate about natural resource governance.
switzerland itself illustrates this point. As noted by the berne declara-
tion (a ngo coalition), the Federal Administration’s own March 2013 report 
failed to disclose how much commodity trading companies pay in taxes to 
switzerland, stating, ‘there are, at present no figures available on tax reve-
nues deriving from the commodities industry’ (berne declaration, 2013). if 
the public is meant to weigh the benefits and costs of hosting these massive 
companies, and to consider what policy response is appropriate, the amount 
of tax revenues is a crucial fact to consider.
dr. thut, in his paper, calls for ‘the design and further refinement of the 
regulatory framework in switzerland, in so far as relevant to the nexus 
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between commodity issues and the legitimate interests and needs of deve-
loping countries.’ the U.s. and the e.U., themselves home to many large oil 
and mining companies, have responded to this same challenge by introdu-
cing regulations that require extractive companies to publish the payments 
they make to foreign governments on a per project basis. Following this lead, 
and ensuring that the laws apply to commodity traders, represents a basic 
first step to ensure coherence between regulation at home and development 
programs abroad.
commodity trading is in particular need of this kind of regulation. the 
deals between traders and governments, both the purchase of raw materials 
and the sale of refined products, often have massive financial implications 
for developing countries. to give a sense of the scale, for example, glencore 
was just awarded the license to buy oil from the government of chad. in 
January 2013, the company shipped its first cargo of 950,000 barrels.39 this 
single sale would net at least Usd 80 million. this may represent a small- or 
medium-sized deal for glencore, but for a poor country like chad, this is a 
massive transaction: the revenues from this single sale are enough to pay for 
half of the country’s yearly education budget. in countries including nigeria, 
congo-brazzaville, Azerbaijan, Yemen, iraq, libya, south sudan and Angola, 
the sale of oil by the state generates more than half of government revenues. 
For many others states, these sales generate the single largest revenue stream.
on the import side, oil trader trafigura currently supplies all of Angola’s 
fuel needs, which is a multi-billion dollar business. And these sales can be 
corruption-prone: nigeria spent Usd 22 billion on fuel subsidies from 2009-
2011, with significant fuel being bought from swiss traders such as Mercuria 
and trafigura, and around Usd 7 billion was lost due to a scam of historic 
proportions.40
without the disclosure of basic information around commodity sales, cor-
ruption risks increase, and there is little chance for citizens, journalists and 
parliaments to know how much their country receives for its public resources. 
requiring companies to operate in a transparent and responsible manner 
does not constitute unfair or uncompetitive treatment. trading companies 
are huge global players that buy billions of dollars of oil and minerals from 
poor countries. wherever they are headquartered in the world, they should 
be the subject of robust oversight and scrutiny. ensuring this is the case is a 
basic responsibility of the home government, and one which the switzerland 
should not avoid.
opacity in payments by traders is not the only practice requiring the atten-
tion of the swiss authorities. other practices that generate concern include 
the influence of huge traders on global market and price integrity, the trade 
in stolen oil, such as from nigeria, or sanctioned oil, such as from iran, and 
taxation and transfer pricing abuses by trading companies. but given the 
precedent set by the Us and eU governments, and the prevalence of high-
39 Reuters (2012) ‘Glencore signs contract to export oil from Chad in 2013’ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/14/
glencore-chad-contract-idUSL5E8NECN620121214 (Accessed on May 13, 2013).
40 Reuters (2012). ‘Nigeria investigates 21 firms for fuel subsidy fraud’ http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/17/nige-
ria-subsidy-fraud-idUKL6E8JH65K20120817 (Accessed on May 13, 2013).
 | 181
Policy Debate Commodity Trading
value deals between trading companies and producer countries with bad 
governance, robust and mandatory reporting standards are a good place to 
start tackling some of the challenges associated with such trade.
Recognizing the silent majority
the second recommendation is hinted at in both dr. thut’s paper as well 
as the Federal council’s report: development assistance that specifically aims 
specifically to improve the public accountability of governments in resource-
rich, poor countries. Providing technocratic advice to the authorities in these 
countries can be useful, but not when the prevailing political economy envi-
ronment enables a small elite to benefit at the expense of the majority. From 
Kazakhstan to equatorial guinea, the voices of citizens, civil society and the 
media need to be heard so that resources are directed to meeting the long-term 
needs of the population.
this idea of supporting civil society and other accountability players is 
widely supported in development circles, but usually plays second fiddle to 
engagement with governments. in light of the power imbalances that oil and 
mineral wealth can help to propagate, these kinds of accountability-focused 
interventions should rather be in the lead. in such an effort, even a relatively 
small donor like switzerland can make a difference. there are examples – 
activists asking questions about the below market value sale of assets by the 
congolese state, a Public interest and Accountability commission in ghana 
issuing regular reports that identify when government veers from the rules 
set out in their new oil legislation, courageous activists who speak out in 
authoritarian contexts like gabon and Azerbaijan – of how this work can 
make a difference. And it is not expensive.
the paper by werner thut, together with other discussions within the swiss 
government this year (particularly, forthcoming discussions in the parlia-
ment), represent a promising discourse. they reflect growing awareness about 
the need to respond to the global challenges which surround the production, 
trade and consumption of natural resources. these are daunting. but with 
collective, serious efforts that extend beyond reputation-driven maneuvers, 
the most damaging costs from extraction can be minimized and the benefits 
to developing countries increased.
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reaction by humberto campodónico, Professor, national University of san Marcos, lima, Peru.
going beyond transparency and good governance
A response to ‘commodities and switzerland:  
development Policy challenges and Policy options’  
by werner thut
the paper by werner thut ‘commodities and switzerland: development 
Policy challenges and Policy options’, from the swiss Agency for development 
and cooperation, has great relevance as it comes from a country that is key 
to the extractive and food industries. this relevance does not come as much 
from switzerland’s role as a producer, but from the fact that, as demonstrated 
by the figures given by thut, it is the world’s largest commodity trading ‘hub’.
Furthermore, this paper comes at a time when several developed countries 
have taken significant measures to promote transparency in the extractive 
industries. the dodd-Frank Act of 2010 from the United states requires extrac-
tive companies to disclose information regarding the payments they make to 
states, on an individual and project-by-project basis. similarly, the european 
Union just voted to approve a project along the same lines, and the canadian 
government has announced an identical measure. the United states is cur-
rently implementing the extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti), 
of which norway has been a member since 2011 and the United Kingdom and 
France will be joining in 2013-2014. in addition, the United nations is cur-
rently discussing a resolution regarding transparency in natural resources.
the swiss development cooperation initiative suggests that it is helpful to 
distinguish between three spheres of action: first, internal development within 
switzerland; second, the projects currently in operation around the world, 
and; third, the agency’s role in ensuring, along other swiss government agen-
cies, ‘policy coherence’ that facilitates greater transparency, and the equitable 
end-use, of the production of extractive industries in resource-rich countries.
it is important to point out from the start that there is a constant conflict, 
as noted in the paper, between, on one hand, the proposal from the swiss 
development cooperation initiative, and the proposal made by other swiss 
government agencies, particularly those closely associated with production 
and trade, on the other.41
this conflict between proposals, we believe, is illustrated by the swiss 
Federal council’s recent report on swiss commodities. this report has been 
strongly criticized by swiss civil society organizations for its insufficient 
new data and, as the report merely makes recommendations and voluntary 
actions, above all, for its lack of concrete measures. we will come back to 
this subject later.
in this paper, we will discuss not only the swiss development cooperation 
issue, but i will also reflect upon some additional subjects relevant to the latin 
41 The paper references questions arising as to the coherence for development of some components of Swiss policy, 
including trade and international taxation policies.
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American perspective. this will allow us to identify both the strengths and 
weaknesses of some of our policies.
1. Importance of the ‘Commodity Trading Hub’ 
it is important to stress that, in this area, switzerland’s key is that of a 
‘broker’ or ‘transit country’, and not a major consumer of raw materials. this 
is a different approach, for example, than that of germany and its access to 
raw materials strategy and campaign.
1. correspondingly, one of the key points to emphasize is that both extrac-
tive and trading companies should be held to the same levels of transparency. 
in this sense, we must mention that the recent measures implemented by the 
United states and the european Union have a direct impact on swiss extractive 
companies, as they trade on the Us and european stock markets.
the question thus becomes: what will happen to swiss trading companies? 
will they also be subject to the transparency requirements?
we must not forget that many of these companies are vertically integrated, 
from production all the way to sales, mediated by shipping and distribution. 
As a result, in order for such policies to be effective, the entire length of the 
value chain must be transparent. this issue must be regulated by legal pro-
visions set by the swiss government.
2. in the paper, werner thut states, ‘while evidence is not conclusive, some 
analyses have found a connection between the business practices of certain 
private actors in the financial markets and a trend towards speculative trades, 
large-scale land grabs and even human rights abuses.’
we believe that there is conclusive evidence of a significant financial capi-
tal participation in the commodity markets that, in turn, as indicated by 
recent works of the United nations conference on trade and development 
(UnctAd), demonstrates speculative intervention. the dodd-Frank Act of 
the United states has gone a step further, mandating the commodity Futures 
trading commission (cFtc) to set limits on the positions companies take in 
commodity futures markets.42 
we think it is very important that switzerland recognizes the central role 
played by swiss markets and private companies in the price formations of the 
commodities markets. what we do not seem to have, however, are concrete 
measures to progress in this direction.
3.thut’s paper mentions that a merger between two swiss companies, glen-
core (a commodity trader) and Xstrata (a mining company), was imminent, 
which would make the merged company the fourth largest in the world. this 
took place in April-May 2013, when the Ministry of commerce of the People’s 
republic of china (MoFcoM) approved the merger. initially, the chinese 
government was concerned, as the dominant market position of glencore-
Xstrata could affect the supply of minerals to china.
As a condition of the merger’s approval, the MoFcoM required the exclu-
sion of las bambas, a Peruvian copper mine acquired by Xstrata in 2004, from 
42 That said, in September 2012, in the District Court of the District of Columbia, Judge Robert Wilkins threw out the 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s new position limits rule, and sent the regulation back to the CFTC for future 
consideration. The future status of such regulations is thus, at this time, unknown.
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the merger. glencore and Xstrata accepted this restriction without consulting 
the Peruvian government, which stopped just short of denouncing the deal. 
other politicians suggested that a complaint regarding this lack of transpa-
rency should be made to the wto.
there is no guarantee, furthermore, that the new company will comply with 
the environmental standards Xstrata followed in the past. Additionally, as, it 
has been agreed that the las bambas sale must provide a profit to glencore-
Xstrata, the start of production at the mine could easily be delayed.43
is this top-down approach consistent with transparency?
4. Finally, the paper also provides important data on illicit financial flows 
and the need to combat them. we completely agree with this point, but would 
argue that the same emphasis must be placed on stemming licit financial flows, 
which results in currency appreciation, a key symptom of dutch disease.
in resource-rich countries, in this era of high mineral prices, these licit 
financial flows are added to the export of natural resources. to combat these 
licit financial flows, states must possess the tools sufficient to prevent capital 
inflow. governments are frequently unable to take such measures, however, 
due to the fact that even though the iMF now permits them, they are banned 
under several international instruments, including free trade agreements (see 
ocampo and gallagher, 2013).
it is important for governments from developed countries, particularly 
the swiss government, to take thut’s words to heart. ‘A trade policy that 
works in conjunction with development policy such that development needs 
of individual countries, particularly the least developed countries (ldc), 
are taken into consideration’ is absolutely necessary. in order to do so, it is 
important to have a holistic vision of development, as suggested at the 2002 
United nations Monterrey conference.
2. The Resource Curse: Going Beyond Transparency Towards Production 
Diversification
there is empirical evidence that countries with significant natural resource 
revenue, have, in many cases, lower growth rates, and higher rates of corrup-
tion, than those with no natural resources. this is the so-called ‘resource 
curse’, the impetus for the increased focus on transparency as a means of 
fighting corruption. this objective has been taken up by the eiti, and the 
measures undertaken to pursue it should be strengthened.
there is also abundant empirical evidence confirming that it is necessary 
to go one step further, towards the forging of effective overall governance 
that includes, of course, transparency. in this sense, we agree with Paul col-
lier’s statement: ‘essentially, if a country has decent governance, the long-run 
effects of high-commodity prices reinforce the benefits of short-run effects. 
the resource curse is confined to countries with weak governance’ (collier, 
2010, 46).
43 The ‘predetermined’ selling price must be greater than the total costs incurred by Glencore and Xstrata at Las Bam-
bas, and greater than the market price at which Glencore valued Las Bambas. http://gestion.pe/movil/noticia/2063842.
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this issue is underlined in the paper by thut, wherein he references the 
examples of norway, the european Union and parliamentary requests in 
switzerland, to name a few.
having said that, as indicated by the resource governance index 2013 
from the revenue watch institute (rwi), several latin American countries 
do, in fact, demonstrate good governance. brazil, Mexico, chile, colombia, 
Peru and trinidad and tobago appeared among the top 11, with a satisfactory 
rating, while bolivia, ecuador and Venezuela achieved a rating of partial 
good governance.
3. Issues of importance for Development Cooperation with the Swiss 
Government
it is evident that the policies for development cooperation must allow 
mutual collaboration. the primary objective of good governance initiatives 
is, firstly, responsibility from resource-rich countries. At the same time, in 
this area, latin American countries are able to benefit from the international, 
including swiss, cooperation for development.
let us take a look at some critical latin American governance issues.
1. the paper recommends that switzerland should ‘support the design and 
further refinement of the swiss regulatory framework in so far as relevant to 
the nexus between commodity issues and the legitimate needs and interests 
of developing countries’.
this could be just as, if not more, important than the measures taken in 
producing countries. it is also important to provide technical assistance to 
producer states in order to better enable them to fight illegal financial flows, 
as mentioned above.
2. it is crucial that revenue obtained from natural resources reaches regional 
and local governments. this is an issue currently under debate throughout 
latin America.
it is not only revenue allocation of revenue that is an important issue, 
moreover, but so its final destination. revenue must be directed in such a 
way that it is able to contribute to the states’ sustainable development. this 
is a subject of great interest for latin American countries, and is already 
being analysed by the Union of south American nations (UnAsUr) and the 
economic commission for latin America and the caribbean (eclAc).
the swiss development cooperation could be very helpful in this area, due 
to its experience in handling decentralized funds and in the quality of the 
investment to be developed.
3. even though progress has been made, tax authorities in resource-rich 
countries often lack the appropriate technical expertise required to effectively 
tax revenues from extractive companies operating in their states. the same is 
true of the government agencies charged with promoting competition.
From this perspective, the swiss proposals could be more explicit, crea-
ting cooperation programs for tax authorities and competition policy-making 
agencies. development cooperation is welcome in these cases.
4. civil society organizations from resource-rich states have contributed 
to better monitoring of extractive industries, with respect to issues of trans-
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parency and governance, as well as environmental conservation (a subject 
thut explicitly does not consider in his paper).
Along these lines, in January 2013, the latin American network of extrac-
tive industries presented the eU/lA parliaments with a proposal containing 
eight conditions for european-based extractive investments in latin America 
at in the eU/latin America summit in santiago. this initiative could be 
reviewed and updated.44
4. Conclusion
we need to go beyond the issue of good governance of natural resources 
and, though it is somewhat outside the scope of this paper, advance towards 
non-excessive dependence on the export of natural resources. this is parti-
cularly important in today’s economic climate, when we seem to be entering 
the last stretch of the super cycle of commodity prices. this means creating 
policies to diversify production and promote technological and scientific 
development. it is therefore essential for governments to have the necessary 
‘policy space’ to implement such policies, an area wherein developed states, 
working through various international organisations (such as the iMF, world 
bank and wto, etc.), could be extremely helpful.
we are at a time when greater initiatives could be implemented and, above 
all, important achievements in the transparency and governance of extractive 
industries could be made. successfully achieving these goals must be an objec-
tive of international organizations, developed countries, the governments of 
resource-rich states and global civil society. we believe that swiss development 
cooperation has set the benchmark for this undertaking. now is the time for 
the swiss government, at its highest levels, to carry out these proposals, in 
keeping with switzerland’s status, as the world’s largest commodity trading 
hub, as one of the most important links in the natural resources value chain.
44 see http://www.oidhaco.org/uploaded/content/article/2042018323.pdf.
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reaction by stéphane graber, general secretary of geneva trading & shipping Association 
(gtsA), <http://www.gtsa.ch>. 
reassessing the Merchants’ role in a globalized 
economy
A response to ‘commodities and switzerland:  
development Policy challenges and Policy options’  
by werner thut
since the 18th century, the perception of the merchants’ role has been 
constantly misunderstood. however, history teaches us that commercial trade 
is key to bringing products to the markets, particularly in an increasingly 
globalized and complex economy. in an evolving environment, the merchants’ 
role needs to be reassessed. the question of their role in the transparency 
debate is relevant but requires a better understanding of the merchants’ cur-
rent function in the value chain.
Definition of Commodity Trading
the commodity value chain involves a large variety of actors performing 
different activities (extraction, logistics, shipping, transformative industries, 
financing, etc.) belonging to the same value chain but following distinct busi-
ness models. As the main professional association for commodity trading and 
shipping in switzerland we will focus on the role and corporate responsibi-
lities of our industry.
due to the fact that commodity trading houses do not directly serve consu-
mer markets, the general public has a limited understanding of the role they 
play in the value chain. the commodity traders play a crucial role in managing 
the relationship with producers and buyers and bridge the gap between sup-
ply and demand along the commodity value chain. they act as an organizer 
and generate added value from their ability to optimize the logistics chain 
and to overcome the price risks (volatility of prices during the transport) and 
operational risks (e.g. climatic hazards, currency volatility, piracy, counter-
party risks and legal risks). they also secure access to resources through the 
establishment of reliable partnerships with producing counterparts.
the publication of the Background Report on Commodities to the Federal 
Council45, in early 2013, has been a key driver in gathering data and dispel-
ling misconceptions about the commodity industry and extractive activities:
commodity trading operates in a highly competitive business environ-
ment and works with a whole range of clients (from private and stock-listed 
companies to state-owned ones), while extractive companies deal exclusively 
with governments.
45 Hereafter ‘Background Report’ (downloadable on http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attach-
ments/30136.pdf, accessed on September 15, 2013).
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commodity trading wins contracts mainly through commercial public 
tenders and works on a much shorter term basis in comparison to the extrac-
tive industry.
commodity trading is an indispensable intermediary remunerated for the 
services provided along the value chain independent of the commodity price 
level, while the extraction industry operates at only one end and generates 
its profits from the difference between extraction costs and market prices.
it is commonly accepted that commodity trading activities are ten to fifteen 
times less profitable than extractive ones, and much more volatile.
when discussing the function of the commodity market these specifics need 
to be recognized but they do not in any way negate their interrelation and the 
common responsibility of commodity trading towards source of supply, just 
as with any other industrial activity (i.e. food processing, distribution, etc.).
‘Resource curse’ or ‘governance curse’?
Although it is true that resource-rich countries face challenges in the mana-
gement of their resources – and more specifically in the allocation of revenue 
generated by their exploitation – it appears that the ‘resource curse’ is more 
of a ‘governance curse’ than anything else.
since the end of the cold war, the reorganization of the switch of twenty-
five African countries to democratic regimes has been accompanied by an 
improvement in their economic outlook. this democratic trend - even though 
not perfect - is synonymous with better governance, increased stability and 
economic development opportunities for these countries (i.e. the promising 
economic perspectives of sub-saharan Africa).
the argument that when it comes to making a deal on oil or cereals private 
corporations are in a stronger position than states might have been true some 
decades ago. it is, however, now irrelevant and refers to a pre-oPec46 vision. 
the prices of commodities are public, accessible, quoted both in the market 
and on platforms, and continuously updated. therefore it is difficult to argue 
that there is real asymmetry of information between private corporations and 
states; this is especially the case in countries where national oil companies 
are strong players. we need to recognize that today 80% of global oil reserves 
are in the hands of national corporations. these companies are not subject 
to the same duty of care and governance as independent trading companies 
based in switzerland. African states reclaim 60% to 90% of the petroleum 
yield depending on their tax system and enforce very strict localized rules 
(e.g. the mandatory recruitment of local workforce and sub-contractors) on 
foreign operators.
in order to secure their deals and to be able to channel goods from supplier 
to customer, commodity traders need reliable partners and a solid infras-
tructure. in that respect, a failed state presents far more problems than good 
market opportunities in jeopardizing their sustainable access to resources.
46 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
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Is transparency in payments the appropriate tool?
the commodity trading industry faces increasing demands to make the 
supply chain more transparent, as a common accusation is that trading com-
panies are less transparent than mining companies. however the previously 
discussed differences in business models between the sectors are of key signi-
ficance here.
commodity trading companies are not contracting states but operate in an 
open competitive environment. they therefore have to preserve their competi-
tive advantage and protect their intangible assets that justify a price premium, 
given that the price for a specific commodity is already known publicly and 
automatically. the mining sector operates on a completely different competi-
tive playing field as there is no public price quotation for resource concessions 
or royalty payments arising from extractive activities.
the real question is whether a transparent revenue policy as advocated by 
Alexandra gillies would achieve the desired goals. would payment disclosure 
make firms and governments more accountable than they already are? would 
it really be the antidote to bribery and market abuses? Are commodity trading 
firms in the position to play this role?
Firstly, the payment disclosure policy raises several technical questions. 
there are some limitations to be taken into account due to the much greater 
amount of transactions in the commodity trading industry compared to the 
mining industry. the trades are made up of a multitude of daily contracts with 
various counterparts and are based on short term contracts, where revenues 
are generated mainly from the volume of transactions, as opposed to extrac-
tion contracts made on a long term agreement over several years involving 
huge financial investment.
Another concern is to ensure that an independent actor is able to undertake 
the task of reconciling those huge volumes of payments and that the benefits 
of fulfilling this task outweighs the cost. Moreover it is necessary to be able 
to analyze the results of such disclosures and understand what disparate 
figures mean. indeed in some countries where the tender processes for oil are 
undertaken by a board, a certain percentage of the royalties is retained to cover 
administrative costs. the amount paid by the company will therefore not tally 
with the money received by the government, even though the process has been 
legal and fair. this can be easily explained on a specific transaction, but the 
task becomes unmanageable on a larger scale of transactions. to all of these 
questions, there are only partial answers and it is not completely clear that 
this process would be worth the administrative burden put on the economic 
agents. Moreover, international organizations like the world bank or iMF are 
in a much stronger position than private firms to promote better governance.
Furthermore, with the continuing increase in the cost of operating in some 
African countries and the growing regulatory pressure on international firms 
to adapt to local state regulation and enforcement, several multinational 
players are being forced to reconsider their involvement in Africa due to the 
discrepancy between home requirements and the local environment business 
regulations. such moves, if confirmed, would undermine the local economies 
and contravene the appeal of the Africa Union commission for more foreign 
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direct investment.47 here again there is a real dilemma concerning the ques-
tion of foreign policy coherence, as economic development is the best way to 
reduce poverty (e.g. consider the example of Asia over the last twenty years). 
this makes the industry favor a multilateral and international approach aimed 
at developing a level playing field, involving local governments.
The challenge of reputational risk
in werner thut’s article ‘commodities and switzerland: development Policy 
challenges and Policy options’, as well as Alexandra gillies in her subsequent 
comments (‘crafting a strategic response to the commodity-development 
conundrum’), assert the risk for switzerland’s reputation raised by activities in 
the commodity sector. this risk is also mentioned in the Background Report. 
commodity trading firms are conscious of this challenge. it is as crucial for 
the swiss government as it is for private commodity houses, which heavily 
depend on various sources of financing. the increased requirements of banks 
and capital markets with regards to corporate social responsibility at a time 
when commodities are becoming more expensive and loans more difficult to 
obtain, confirm that trading companies need to strengthen their creditwor-
thiness and their image.
the swiss-based commodity industry is at a cross-roads. Just as in any other 
business sector, its practices are quickly evolving. these changes are driven by 
varying demand and by new stakeholder expectations. through experience, 
their staff have become aware of their influence at a social and environmentally 
sustainable level and have proactively and voluntarily decided to enhance the 
management of their companies. the visible effects of these decisions are com-
pulsory codes of conduct and training that are applicable to all staff members. 
they have also increased the number of internal compliance authorities in 
order to ensure the both swiss and international legal networks are respected 
as they provide a complex direct and indirect compulsory framework.
in his call for action, werner thut advocates a swiss foreign policy which 
would help to ensure that resource profits benefit their population. clearly 
this is an agreeable objective. however this approach raises question with 
regards to the sovereignty of these countries: knowing that producing countries 
already control the major part of their resources, how could this be achieved 
without interfering in other state matters? cohesion is also needed in the way 
switzerland deals with its partners. the swiss authorities usually promote 
mutual respect rather than a more patronizing approach, and it would be 
sharply felt if they were to apply a different criteria to their emerging state 
counterparts than their european counterparts.
47 See the address by Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the first woman to head the African Union Commission, who urged 
African Member States and international partners to invest more in order to promote job creation in the region. (ILO web 
site: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_216158/lang--en/index.htm, accessed on August 
7, 2013).
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Conclusion
the commodity trading sector operates in a globalized economy and is 
subject to the same challenges as all other economic agents with a global 
footprint. its practices are adapting to meet new expectations and there are 
no grounds for pinpointing them more than other multinationals. this is 
especially true when it comes to transparency. indeed the charge of a lack of 
transparency is not only leveled at corporations but is also a current debate 
within the not for profit sector and ngos.
the swiss commodity sector has spontaneously committed itself to parti-
cipating in the multi-stakeholder dialogue launched by the swiss authorities 
to promote the implementation of the Un guiding principles on business 
and human rights. the industry is also proactively engaging with the admi-
nistration to follow up on the 17 recommendations made at the conclusion 
of the Background Report. with its expertise and humanitarian tradition, 
switzerland offers a multilateral and unique platform conducive to thoughtful 
leadership and improvements in the management of the commodity economy 
worldwide. it would clearly be of no use for switzerland to implement a policy 
on its own with little impact on a globalized economy. those who campaign 
for switzerland to play a leading role and to set an example should commend 
the courage of the swiss authorities in adopting an innovative approach that 
aims to make a real difference and is far more exacting than simply passing 
more regulations.
